

*Democracy and Civil War*¹

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Democracy relates closely to civil war. In this chapter, we investigate ten propositions: Democracy is negatively related to the onset and severity of civil war and positively to duration. Democracy relates to civil war through an inverted U-curve: semi-democracies are most prone to violence. Political instability is positively related to civil war. The curvilinear effect of democracy on civil war persists even when controlling for political instability. Civil war occurs more frequently in conjunction with elections. The effect of democracy on civil war is more pronounced for government conflicts than for territorial conflicts. The effect of democracy on civil war is stronger for developed countries. A politically different neighborhood is positively related to civil war. The negative effect of democracy on civil war is more pronounced for inclusive types of democracy. These relationships are generally strengthened after the end of the Cold War. Using two different measures of democracy, we test these hypotheses on the Uppsala/PRIO conflict data. Overall, we find democracy to be strongly related to civil war, with the results for severity being the most robust.

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Introduction

In this chapter, we investigate the question of the democratic civil peace – i.e. the democratic peace at the intrastate level. We use interchangeably the terms civil war and intrastate violence for events where organized violence is used for political goals, although conventionally the term “war” is often reserved for conflicts where the annual number of battle deaths exceed 1,000. We study the determinants of the onset of civil war as well as the incidence, duration, and severity of violent events.

Recent research on civil war uses arguments regarding the opportunity and motivation for rebellion as a theoretical point of departure. We discuss how democratic institutions may affect both the opportunity and the willingness to use violence for political purposes. Democratic institutions display great variations, however, in terms of inclusiveness, effectiveness, and stability. The opportunity and motivation framework allows us to derive a set of expectations concerning when and under what conditions democratic institutions may succeed in reducing the risk, incidence, duration, and severity of civil war.

The general hypothesis emerging from this discussion is that democratic governance is beneficial for the reduction of civil war and that specific forms of democracy are likely to reduce violence more than others. Specifically, we investigate these propositions: Democracy is negatively related to the onset and severity of civil war and positively to duration. Democracy relates to civil war through an inverted U-curve: semi-democracies are most prone to violence. Political instability is positively related to civil war. The curvilinear effect of democracy on civil war persists even when controlling for political instability. Civil war occurs more frequently in conjunction with elections. The effect of democracy on civil war is more pronounced for government conflicts than for territorial conflicts. The effect of democracy on civil war is stronger for developed countries. A politically different neighborhood is positively related to civil war. The negative effect of democracy on civil war is more pronounced for inclusive types of democracy. These relationships are generally strengthened after the end of the Cold War. We test these hypotheses on the Upp-

sala/PRIO conflict data, and investigate the robustness of our results. We use two measures of democracy, the democracy index from the Polity project and the new SIP index, with some robustness tests using two additional measures, Vanhanen's Polyarchy index and the Freedom House Political Rights measure. Overall, we find democracy to be strongly related to civil war, with the results for severity being the most robust.

Theoretical framework

Actors

All organized violence is by definition a dyadic phenomenon, where someone acts violently upon someone else. Two actors are required, both organized parties, one of which is a government of an independent country.³ Our main interest lies in the characteristics of the government side. Additional actors may also be involved, including other governments, but here we assume that they are allies of one or the other of the primary actors. In the analyses reported in this chapter, we use no data about the opposition side, except that it is organized.⁴ This is not necessarily a serious limitation, since our interest is in exploring the effects of the system of governance on civil war. However, in future extensions it might be of interest to look at the political ideology and aspirations of the opposition side for a more truly dyadic analysis, comparable to the analysis of the dyadic democratic peace at the interstate level.

Much scholarly debate has revolved around what type of actor a typical rebel group is: Is it the military organization of a broad social movement that seeks to address government injustice or promote democratization (e.g. Lichbach 1995), or the armed branch of a minority group that requires some sort of cultural autonomy relative to the government or the country's majority (Sambanis 2001), or is it just a

³ In the Uppsala/PRIO terminology (see Gleditsch et al. 2002, Strand et al. 2005), which we generally follow, conflicts where no government is involved (sometimes labeled communal conflicts) are termed *non-state conflicts*. Conflicts where the nonstate actor is unorganized (variously genocide, politicide, or democide) are labeled *one-sided conflicts*. See Mack (2006) for a presentation of data on non-state conflicts 2002–05 and Eck and Hultman (2007) for a presentation of data on one-sided conflicts 1989–2004.

⁴ For dyadic analyses of civil war with more data on the opposition side, see Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan (2006) and Raleigh and Hegre (2006).

military organization designed to forward the private political and economic interests of its leaders (Collier 2000a)? Actors may also be a combination of these types, and transform from one to another in the course of the conflict. Examples of all these types may be found among the world's rebel organizations, but the empirical study of civil war is affected by how common each of these are. Rebel groups are not homogenous either, and the leaders' motivations may be very different from those of ordinary soldiers.

Motivation and opportunity

We conceptualize civil war as a product of motive and opportunity. On the rebel side, a motive can be negative – a grievance against the existing state of affairs, or positive – a desire to get rich, sometimes called greed in the civil war literature. Researchers that focus on grievance typically discuss broad social movements, whereas greed motivations tend to be associated with narrow groups or elites within such movements. A prominent example of the first category is the ANC's decision to take up arms against the apartheid regime, while the latter category is often illustrated with Charles Taylor's rise (and fall) in Liberia.

Second, potential rebels must have a realistic opportunity to achieve their goal. The realization of their desires may be blocked by a powerful well-organized government army, by geographical factors (if the rebels are thinly spread out or are unable to establish defensible headquarters), by the lack of financial means (if they are very poor), or by the inability to build an effective military organization (Collier 2000b; Lichbach 1995).

Both opportunity and motivation affect the length of conflict. The rebels need motivation to keep on fighting. They also have to meet their financial needs. Group cohesion is necessary to minimize deterrence and the risk that the group splits into two or more competing rebel groups or becomes severely weakened by defection. Conditions that facilitate cohesion may therefore provide another set of opportunities for rebellion.

Various models of conflict are related to this two-factor model of rebellion. Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004) formulated their model around the concepts of greed and grievance (see also Berdal and Malone 2000). In other writings, Collier and Hoeffler stress the opportunity for rebellion. To some extent, they focus on economic opportunity, which is akin to greed as a motive, but they also study the geographical opportunity for rebels, notably rough terrain (forest cover and mountains). Collier and Hoeffler recognize that both opportunity and motivation are necessary for the outbreak of civil war. They argue, however, that a justice-seeking rebellion has to overcome a set of challenges that a rebellion based on greed does not have to address as long as it has the opportunity to organize a viable rebellion (Collier 2000b, Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 587–588). They support this argument with an empirical analysis where they do not find civil wars primarily in countries where there are many grievances, but rather in countries where there are large opportunities for challenging the government militarily. An analysis of the opportuni-

ties and motivation for rebellion is also central in the World Bank project on civil war (Collier et al. 2003).

Similarly, in the study of interstate war, Most and Starr (1989, 23) posit that decisions to go to war require opportunity and willingness. Willingness refers to “the choice (and process of choice) that is related to the selection of some behavioral option from a range of alternatives”, while opportunity is a shorthand term for “the possibilities that are available within any environment”. In essence, this is the same model that we use to study civil war.

The two conditions of civil war can also be applied to the government side: The government’s motive can be a narrowly self-interested wish to remain in power or a more altruistic desire to keep the nation together and protect the existing structure of governance. The government’s opportunities are influenced by the available instruments of repression (including preponderance if not a monopoly on armed force) but also by the minimization of the geographical factors that create opportunities for the rebels.

Both motivation and opportunity is required for armed conflict to occur. The argument reviewed above implies an interactive effect of the two theoretical concepts: To the extent that we can quantify the extent of motivation and of opportunities for organized violence for a group, the risk of armed conflict is an increasing function of the product of these two quantities:

$$\text{risk of civil war} = f(M \cdot O)$$

Identity

Several authors (e.g. Gurr 1970) see identity as a third factor in rebellion on a par with motivation and opportunity. Ellingsen (2000, 229) identifies the same three factors but labels them frustration, opportunity, and identity.

Whether or not a group of individuals share a common identity affects both their opportunities and motivations for rebellion or – in the case of individuals loyal to the government – for successful anti-insurgent warfare. A common identity is essential for group formation. Regardless of the motives of the rebels, they will not act together unless they see themselves as being in the same boat. A perception of injustice perpetrated against someone is most likely to be a motivation for an armed conflict if the injustice affects an identifiable group rather than isolated individuals.

A common identity also affects opportunity, however: A rebel group that recruits its members from a social group with a long history of interaction may more easily solve the collective action and coordination challenges that the organization of an effective army poses (Gates 2002; Collier 2000b). A government also needs a certain amount of coherence to fight a civil war. Lacking this, it may collapse at the first rebel challenge.

Risk of onset, incidence, duration, and severity

An analysis of motivation and opportunity is fruitful for the study of onset (when civil war breaks out), for incidence (the proportion of country-years that have an

ongoing civil war), and for duration (how long the violence lasts). The incidence of conflict is a function of the risk of onset and of duration – incidence is high in countries where the risk of onset is large, or when conflicts tend to be long. Incidence is highest where conflicts are both very probable and likely to last for a long time. Moreover, motivation and opportunity affect how severe a war becomes. To the extent that actors have motivation and opportunity for initiating violent conflict, they will also tend to have incentives to prolong and escalate the fighting.

There are differences, however. If only a narrow group has the opportunity and motivation to initiate and sustain an armed insurgency, the conflict may be long but not particularly severe. The Basque and Northern Ireland conflicts are examples of such enduring but relatively low-scale conflicts.

Motivations may also shift during conflict. Collier (2000a) argues that rebel group leaders are forced to rely on private incentives even when the initial motivation is to address injustices. This may cause the insurgency to shift its motivation from “justice-seeking” to “loot-seeking”, and the factors that help explaining a conflict’s initiation may be less relevant for explaining its continuation.

Democracy and the conditions of violence

Democratic governance in itself can be seen as a conflict management system where different interests meet and are resolved peacefully. Democracy is related to civil war through motivation as well as opportunity.

Motivation

For broadly-based opposition groups that organize to change a government’s policy regarding redistribution or cultural issues, effective, inclusive and responsive democratic institutions reduces the motivation for armed resistance. Legitimate demands have a good chance of being met through such institutions. Democratic countries are in general less repressive than non-democracies (Zanger 2000). The absence of repression and the assurance of some political rights remove some of the motivation for rebellion in and of itself (Muller and Weede 1990).

However, democracy cannot remove motivations for rebellion for all potential rebel groups. The IRA rebelled against the UK government over the right to secede, and in Chile a military coup in 1973 removed not only the elected government but the whole democratic system. The majority may perceive the political demands of narrow opposition groups as too extreme, such as a demand for secession or an alternative form of political system. In many circumstances these demands are not compatible with the democratic system present or the system may not be sufficiently inclusive to handle the demand. Such groups may have a motivation for armed resistance even in democracies.

However, the narrower the group, the smaller the chance that it will succeed through a military strategy. A group that is narrow enough to be excluded from politics will therefore be deterred by bleak expectations. But very narrow groups that primarily seek private gains will not be less motivated to use force in democracies.

Opportunity

Democracy may also offer an opportunity for the rebels to organize an insurrection, given the greater openness and more liberal practices of democratic regimes. These liberal practices do not only allow individuals more space and time, but also open up for organization of political interests unknown under autocratic regimes. This openness is most often used in liberal ways, such as trade and commerce, but under some circumstances it can be detrimental to civil peace.

By allowing political organizations, the potential for rebellion is always present, but it is intensified if there is a change in the political regime that limits the organizational freedom. In Algeria a very violent conflict was spawned from a failed liberalization process. The aim of that process was to create a modern-style democracy but in the face of a likely fundamentalist victory a crackdown severely limited the political freedoms.

On the other hand, democratic governance severely limits the opportunity of democratic leaders. Through mechanisms often referred to as checks and balances, democracy is as much about limiting executive power as selecting the executive officer. After losing an election, a democratic politician has a choice between adhering to the result and opting for another chance at the next election or mounting a rebellion against the electoral outcome. A consolidated democracy is often defined as a system where the latter alternative always is the worst option.

Summing up how democracy affects civil war through motivation and opportunity, we assume that the motive can be modeled as $(1-D)$, where the degree of democracy is measured on a scale from 0 to 1. But democracy may also offer an opportunity for the rebels to organize an insurrection, given the greater openness and more liberal practices of democratic regimes. Thus, we may model the opportunity for rebellion simply as D on the same scale of democracy. Ignoring other motives as well as geographic and economic opportunity factors, our simple model of the risk of civil war becomes

$$\text{risk of civil war} = f(D(1-D)),$$

which yields an inverted U-curve between democracy and the risk of civil war.

Identity

The political norms that keep democracies stable can be seen as a form of identity – a democratic identity. This form of identity is not formed overnight, but is shaped through positive experiences of democratic governance. In contrast, the formal democratization of a country through the setup of electoral institutions can happen much faster. This creates a potentially dangerous situation where other identities than the democratic identity play important roles. Snyder (2000) has shown how nationalism in fragmented societies can lead a process of democratization into civil war, as it did in post-Tito Yugoslavia.

We assume that the identity of a coherent polity is stronger than an incoherent one. However, we believe that a regime with a high level of democracy is more coherent than one with a high level of autocracy. In the former, political challengers will aim to take over the government, but not to change the political system. The incumbent will yield to the response of the electorate and will step aside in an orderly transition. In autocracies, regime changes are rarely that orderly. The regime is more likely to change along with the power-holders and violence is more likely. To the extent that identity is seen as a separate factor, it should reinforce the inverted U-shaped relationship.

Hypotheses

Level of democracy

These considerations regarding how democratic institutions affect motivation and opportunity give rise to a set of hypotheses. The most general expectation is that democracy reduces the motivation for conflict. At the same time, however, democracy increases the opportunity of conflict. We argued above that the risk of civil war is proportional to the product of motivation and opportunities for a country's potential rebels. Democratization in a non-democracy has therefore two counteracting effects, and the combination of motive and opportunity produces an inverted U-shaped relationship between democracy and rebellion. In other words, in strictly authoritarian states, the probability of rebellion is low, since the opportunity is close to zero. In near-perfect democracies, the motive for rebellion is close to zero, so the probability of rebellion is low. In the in-between area of semi-democracy (or semi-autocracy), the probability of rebellion is the highest. Applying the same model to the government side, yields the same result. Coherent polities, whether autocratic or democratic, have a strong motivation for maintaining the regime, whether for egotistical or altruistic reasons. Incoherent (or inconsistent) polities in the middle have a much weaker sense of purpose. They are also likely to be weaker in both normative and repressive power. Thus, the likely reaction of the government side reinforces the inverted U-shape posited for the probability of rebellion.

Another implication of the two counteracting effects is that if a group is sufficiently motivated and dedicated to start a rebellion against a democratic regime, we should expect this conflict to be more durable than under other regimes. Not only are groups that use armed force against democratic regimes particularly motivated, but their democratic opponents are less capable adversaries as they are unable to use the wide range of counterinsurgency methods available to autocrats, such as mass killings and collective punishment. The expectation that democracies use relatively mild counter-insurgency measures makes us expect that conflicts in democracies will be less severe but also more durable.

H1: Democracy is negatively related to the onset and severity of civil war, but positively related to duration. Democracy has an indeterminate effect on incidence.

H2: Democracy relates to the onset, incidence, duration, and severity of civil war through an inverted U-curve: semi-democracies are most prone to violence.

Change in institutions

We also relate change in political institutions to civil war. Autocratic countries do not become mature consolidated democracies overnight but usually go through a rough transition. The transition process opens up opportunities for potential rebels. de Tocqueville, writing on the French revolution, (1856/1955, 182) points out that “revolutions do not always come when things are going from bad to worse. . . . Usually the most dangerous time for a bad government is when it attempts to reform itself”. The same observation holds true for the Russian revolution and subsequent civil war.

Even when the change is in the direction of democracy, it may not be sufficient to reduce all relevant groups’ motivation for war. Autocrats are likely to release their grip on society only when they find the status quo to be unsustainable, and will not reform more than they find necessary. Przeworski (1991) argues that a partial liberalization will be received as too little in the eyes of civil society, which will give the autocrats a choice between caving in to the demands present or to retreat into an excessively repressive regime. Democratization may also motivate former elites to instigate coups or other armed attempts at reinstating the former status quo. If the direction of change is toward autocracy, the deconsolidation of political institutions also implies increasing repression (Zanger 2000, 225–226). In turn, such repression is likely to promote civil war (Lichbach 1987, 1995; Moore 1998).

Huntington (1991, 192ff.) also finds political violence to be coupled with democratization. Autocratic incumbents are unlikely to yield power without some resistance, which could result in serious conflict. Communal groups in liberalizing autocracies have substantial opportunities for mobilization, but such states usually lack the institutional resources to reach the kinds of accommodation typical of established democracy (Gurr 1993, 165). When authoritarianism collapses and is followed by ineffectual efforts to establish democracy, the interim period of relative anarchy is ripe for ethno-national or ideological leaders who want to organize rebellion, as several post-communist states have experienced.

The initial high level of uncertainty and unrest caused by democratization will gradually diminish as protesters abandon their aspirations or find ways to obtain part of what they want within the new regime. In the case of democratization, new and more open institutions take root and promote a peaceful resolution of domestic conflict. As time passes, these become more entrenched, and the likelihood of regime failure decreases. The pattern works similarly for autocratization. As repressive institutions strengthen, the effect of the regime change is less destabilizing and therefore less likely to generate political violence.

Semidemocracies are politically less stable than either autocracies or democracies (Hegre et al. 2001, Table 1, 38; Gates et al. 2006). The hypothesis that low political stability predicts to civil war is therefore consistent with an inverted U-

shaped relationship between civil war and the level of democracy. We hypothesize, however, that a curvilinear effect of democracy on civil war persists even when controlling for political instability.

H3: Political instability is positively related to the onset, incidence, duration, and severity of civil war, but most clearly for onset.

H4: The curvilinear effect of democracy on the onset, incidence, duration, and severity of civil war persists even when controlling for political instability.

Elections

In democracies, elections provide the main focal points for political change. The difference between winning and losing an election is larger in some societies and smaller in others. In consolidated democracies losing an election simply means that one has to wait an election period and try again. In other societies, this option is less certain, since an incumbent may cancel or rig a subsequent election. We posit that losing an election can provide strong motivation for rebellion if the loss is accompanied with a high distrust of the winner. This leads us to predict that holding all other political factors constant, violence should be more likely right after an election – or just before, in a pre-emptive strike by a likely loser. However, as more and more elections are held within a political regime, the less reasonable it seems to suspect the likelihood of another election. We therefore posit a more precise expectation. When the government of a new regime faces an election, the uncertainty regarding democratic procedures is likely to be the highest. We single out this first contest as the point most likely of experiencing armed conflict.

H5: The risk of civil war is higher in conjunction with elections, and particularly so for the first contested election in a new political regime. Elections also tend to be accompanied by a lower risk of conflict termination and increases in severity.

Territorial vs. governmental conflict

Several scholars have argued that different kinds of civil war can have different explanations. A violent coup differs dramatically from a secessionist conflict. Fearon and Laitin (2003), for example, perform separate analyses of ethnic civil conflicts. Starting from the distinction between territorial and government conflicts in the Uppsala/PRIO conflict data, Buhaug (2006) argues that the nature of the opportunity determines the direction of the conflict. Large countries are more likely to experience conflicts in peripheral areas where rebels will fight for secession. Capturing the central government is hard and may not even be necessary to redress the rebels' grievances. In such cases, opportunity and motivation are present for territorial conflicts, but not for governmental ones.

Smaller countries are generally less suitable for separatist insurgency, but in such countries, capturing the government is also a more realistic option. Ethnic diversity and rough terrain also offer good grounds for secession, whereas institutional consistency is particularly effective at preventing conflicts over state apparatus. We therefore hypothesize that the relationships discussed above between the

level of democracy and onset, incidence, duration, and severity of civil war will be more pronounced for governmental conflicts.

H6: The effect of democracy on the onset, incidence, duration, and severity of civil war is more pronounced for government conflicts than for territorial conflicts.

Efficiency of institutions

Democratic institutions primarily reduce the risk of armed conflict by addressing grievances – by allocating government funds to widely useful public goods, by ensuring equitable redistribution, or by granting individuals freedom of choice in religious and cultural issues.

Democracies vary in terms of how successful they are in delivering these policy outcomes, however. A well-functioning parliament that produces optimal decisions may not succeed in averting violence if decisions fail to be implemented by inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy, or if the government has only a limited presence in the home region of potential insurgents. Some students of the democratic peace at the interstate level have argued that the effect is likely to be stronger for highly developed societies, while for low-development countries it will be weak or even totally absent (Hegre 2000; Mousseau 2000; Mousseau, Hegre, and Oneal 2003). A similar argument can be made for civil war (Hegre 2003, 2005): The motivation and opportunity for rebellion are not determined only by the value of a territory, or a group's financial and organizational strength, but also of the usefulness of armed force to obtain control over the valuables. The mobility of capital in highly developed democracies may reduce the incentives for (territorial) conflict – it may be profitable to use armed force to gain control over a diamond mine or a rich agricultural province, but not to gain control over Silicon Valley. This affects potential rebel groups as much as governments. On the other hand, a highly developed non-democracy is likely to experience conflicts over the political system itself – a well-educated citizenry has both motivation and opportunity to fight for democratization.

Moreover, an educated and informed citizenry is essential to making democratic institutions fully effective in constraining the political leadership, so that it carries out the policies that the voters prefer. Good systems of education and the free flow of information may in turn be dependent on economic development. In addition, it is clear that high-income democracies are much more stable than low-income democracies (Lipset 1959; Przeworski et al. 2000; Gates et al. 2006). Confidence in the ability of democratic institutions to provide just and equitable distribution of resources is likely to decrease “grievance”. It is clear that this confidence should be larger the more stable the institutions are, and hence greater in high-income democracies. In terms of our opportunity and motivation framework, the citizens of highly developed democracies have greater opportunities for rebellion, but this is offset by less powerful motives to do so. In addition, the opportunities for the government to use armed force at the expense of own citizens are more limited in highly developed countries. We therefore hypothesize that the posited rela-

tionships between civil war and the level of democracy will be stronger the higher the level of development.

H7: The effect of democracy on the onset, incidence, duration, and severity of civil war is stronger for developed countries.

Democratic neighborhood

Most civil wars have transnational dimensions. Murdoch and Sandler (2002) and others have found economic spillovers from civil wars to proximate countries, and there are many instances where political instability in one country destabilizes neighboring countries. For example, the 1997 conflict in DRC was influenced by the civil war in Rwanda. One of the possible mechanisms behind the spatial diffusion stems from the character of the political system in neighboring countries. Democratic government is likely to have an effect on neighboring states by setting an example and sometimes by coercion. Rebels in autocratic countries are likely to be motivated by democratic rights won in neighboring countries. Democratic governments may see neighboring autocracies as a threat and may decide to support rebel movements overtly or covertly in order to weaken or overturn the regime. Gleditsch (2007, 298) hypothesizes that the less democratic the political institutions of neighboring countries, the higher the risk that a country will experience a civil war.

Here, we take a slightly different starting-point, inspired by research on the interstate democratic peace, which indicates that mixed political dyads have the highest risk of war (Gleditsch and Hegre 1997). Rather than attacking its neighbor directly, a government can fuel a rebellion, and thereby fight through a proxy. The Indonesian involvement in the Malayan civil war in the 1960s is a clear case. This leads us to expect that civil war is less likely in democracies when neighboring countries are also democracies, but more likely in autocracies and semi-democracies.

H8: A democratic neighborhood is negatively related to the onset, incidence, duration, and severity of civil war in a democracy and positively related to civil war in a semidemocracy and an autocracy.

Inclusiveness of democratic institutions

Democracy can take different forms. Reynal-Querol (2002) finds that more inclusive forms of governance are less likely to experience violence. She defines inclusiveness as the maximum distance between the preferences of any population group and the aggregated preference produced by the political system. Her finding is based both on comparisons of different electoral systems and on the presence of so-called veto players – institutional constraints on the executive branch. The logic behind this argument rests on Downs' (1957) economic theory of conflict and asserts that while a majoritarian system overall produces the most efficient policies, this efficiency might damage a minority to the extent that it chooses to rebel against this policy. A more inclusive system, such as those based on proportional representation will be more representative and therefore build larger compromises, reducing the motivation for rebellion.

This view, however, is not unopposed. Not all political systems are best described by the model presented by Downs. In a situation where a society is split along a single issue, such as identity, ideology or religion, all political parties must communicate a clear and unambiguous stance on this issue. A proportional representation system will include more parties and most likely increase the level of competition. Writing on Indian politics, Wilkinson (2004) shows how intense political competition over issue salience drives these parties to violent means in order to focus the political agenda on the ethnical cleavages. Extremist tactics polarize these societies further. This might benefit the extreme parties, but for the political system as a whole it results in a dangerous political outcome far from the median voter's preference.

While the two views differ with regard to which set of institutions should be more likely to experience conflict in the first place, they agree that conflicts in more inclusive systems should be shorter as well as less severe. In addition to testing the effect of proportional representation, as does Reynal-Querol, we want to look at federalism and parliamentarism (as opposed to presidentialism). We assume that these more inclusive forms of democracy are likely to have a greater dampening effect on civil war. We hypothesize that this is true for the onset, incidence, duration, and severity of civil war.

H9: The effect of democracy on the onset, incidence, duration, and severity of civil war is more pronounced for inclusive types of democracy.

The impact of the Cold War

Finally, we assume that the various relationships between democracy and civil war are generally strengthened after the end of the Cold War. The reason for this is the polarization during the Cold War, which led Western democratic powers to support autocratic, non-communist regimes as the lesser evil. This external support reduced the opportunities for insurgency against otherwise weak governments. The East and West supplied proxy wars in Angola, Central America, and elsewhere and most of these conflicts ended when the outside support dried up. After the Cold War, rebel groups have been forced to a much larger extent to rely on the opportunities that are determined by domestic conditions, such as the availability of lootable resources (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) and weak governments (Hegre et al. 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003).

Such polarization has occurred in other world-encompassing conflicts, too. During the fight against Nazism, Western democracies tolerated (or even supported) communist regimes and insurgencies as a lesser evil than Nazism. In the present "war on terror", autocratic regimes in the Middle East are more palatable than radical and anti-Western Islamic regimes. Yet, most of the time after 1989 has been less polarized than the Cold War years. We might expect to find the world reverting to greater polarization after 2001, but this period is too short to allow testing of such a hypothesis.

H10: The relationships specified in the previous hypotheses are generally strengthened after the end of the Cold War.

Previous empirical studies

A number of studies have addressed these issues. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) dismissed democracy as an influence on the onset of civil war, but their research design with five-year periods is not well suited to study the impact of political factors. Fearon and Laitin (2003) and others also fail to find a linear relationship between democracy and civil war. Carey (2007), however, found that countries with different forms of executive election had (in varying degrees) lower risks of large-scale violent dissent (using data from Banks 2000) than countries with no elections. Several studies have also concluded that there is no relationship between democracy and the duration of civil war (Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2004, De Rouen and Sobek 2004; Fearon 2004). However, Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) found democracy to be negatively related to the incidence of civil war in Africa and Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) found the same for a global study.

The inverted U-curve between the level of democracy and civil war was reported by Muller and Weede (1990) and Ellingsen and Gleditsch (1997). In a model with an extensive set of control variables, Hegre et al. (2001) found the inverted U for the onset of civil war for the entire Correlates of War period (1816–1992) as well as for the post-World War II period (1946–92). Hegre et al. also found a minor and non-significant negative linear effect of democracy on civil war and a positive and significant effect of political instability, as measured by the proximity of the most recent regime change. The inverted U-curve has also been found in global studies by Sambanis (2001), de Soysa (2002), Reynal-Querol (2002), Bates et al. (2003), Smith (2004), Urdal (2005), and Bussmann and Schneider (2007), but not in Hegre, Gissinger & Gleditsch (2003). A similar finding is reported by Auvinen (1997). Fearon and Laitin (2003) found that a dummy variable for anocracy (semi-democracy) had a positive influence on civil war, consistent with the inverted U hypothesis. Krause and Suzuki (2005) report an inverted U-curve for Asia as well as for Sub-Saharan Africa, as do Henderson & Singer (2000) for the post-colonial states of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Bussmann, Schneider & Wiesehomeier (2005) report an inverted U-curve for Sub-Saharan Africa, but with such a high turning-point that most of the countries are on the upward slope of the curve.

The inverted-U finding relies mostly on the coding of the Polity democracy index. Treier and Jackman (2005) argue that measurement errors in the index, especially at the two ends of the scale, necessitate the use of correction methods. This problem is particularly acute when using a non-linear specification of the variable. In a reanalysis of Hegre et al. (2001), they conclude that there is no significant relationship between democracy squared and civil war onset. However, unlike Treier and Jackman we think that the measurement error is greatest in the middle rather than at the end points of the scale. Pure and consistent regimes are easily identified, while the exact nature of a mixed regime is hard to assess. Thus, we question whether measurement error biases the result in the way that they claim.

A more serious problem with the Polity index is pointed out by Hegre et al. (2001), Vreeland (2008), and Strand (2006: Ch. 5). If there is “factionalism” in a country with democratic institutions, e.g. intense inter-group conflicts that may or may not be violent, the Polity index will code the country as an imperfect democracy. Hence, the finding that imperfect democracies have more civil war may have a tautological element. Vreeland and Strand also reanalyze Hegre et al. (2001), and find the evidence for the inverted U to be much weaker when removing the two components of Polity that contain this coding. In an extensive analysis, Hegre and Sambanis (2006) also find robust evidence for the inverted U-shaped relationship when using the Polity variables. They do not find any relationship when replacing these with variables that remove the “factionalism” component. We return to this issue in the empirical analysis.

There are few studies of the relationship between elections and subsequent violence. Bates et al. (2003) find that in particular the second election is a critical turning point in partial democracies. Strand (2006: Ch. 8) corroborates this finding, and finds a conditional relationship between proximity to an election and a heightened risk of conflict onset.

Hegre (2003) found strong evidence that democracy is correlated with civil peace only for developed countries and for countries with high levels of literacy. Conversely, he found that the risk of civil war decreases with development only for democratic countries. Buhaug (2006) introduced the distinction between civil wars over territory and government and found the inverted U-curve for the latter but not for the former. Gleditsch (2002a, 106; 2007) found that the degree of democracy in neighboring countries had a significant effect on the risk of civil war, in fact greater than the country-specific effect of democracy.

As noted, Reynal-Querol (2002) found empirical support for the conflict-dampening effect of more inclusive types of democracy, as did Schneider and Wiesehomeyer (2005). Carey (2007) found that countries with executives elected through multiparty elections have lower risk of insurgency than countries without elections. But so do countries with single-candidate elections. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) found that power sharing among former combatants specified in a peace agreement increased the likelihood that peace will endure after a civil war. They suggest that this occurs because of the unique capacity of power-sharing institutions to foster a sense of security among former enemies and encourage conditions conducive to a self-enforcing peace. Binningsbø (2006) also found that power sharing – and particularly the formation of a grand coalition – increased the duration of peace after the end of a conflict. However, Hegre and Sambanis (2006: 526) found that presidentialism was associated with a lower risk of civil war onset.

Using a new dataset on battle deaths (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005), Lacina (2006) found the determinants of conflict severity to be quite different from those for conflict onset. Democracy, rather than economic development or state military strength, is most strongly correlated with fewer deaths.

Data

Since the content of democracy itself is a highly debatable subject, it is not surprising that a large number of operationalizations are found in the academic literature. Despite some criticism (e.g. Gleditsch and Ward 1997), the empirical literature in international relations and peace research has overwhelmingly chosen to use the data from the Polity project (Jagers and Gurr 1995; Marshall and Jagers 2003).⁵ The empirical confirmation of the inverted U is largely based on Polity. We start our analysis using this dataset, but most of our analyses use the SIP index from the MIRPS⁶ dataset (Gates et al. 2006), which differs from Polity in that the participation dimension is based on reported election turnout as reported in Vanhanen (2000).

The civil war data all come from the Uppsala/PRIO conflict dataset. We rely on onset data from Strand (2006: Ch. 4); incidence data from Gleditsch et al. (2002), most recently updated in Harbom, Högbladh, and Wallensteen (2006); duration data from Gates and Strand (2006); and data on severity (battle-deaths) from Lacina and Gleditsch (2005). We include all the conflicts in the Uppsala/PRIO dataset, which has a lower level for inclusion at 25 battle-deaths in a given year.⁷

Proximity to regime change is based on the SIP measure, where a change is defined as either a halving or doubling of participation; a change in the institutional recruitment of the executive (i.e. whether the executive is elected or not); or a change in Polity's executive constraints dimension of more than one unit. Political difference is defined as difference between the democracy level as measured by the SIP index of a given country and the average of all non-transitional regime values within a distance of 100 km that meet the Gleditsch and Ward (1999) system membership criterion. The variable is continuous and ranges from -1 (neighbors are democratic while the country itself is non-democratic) to 1 (the country is dem-

⁵ Many economists prefer to use the data on political rights from Freedom House (annual) and a few scholars use the Polyarchy data developed by Vanhanen (2000). For a survey of nine measures of democracy, see Munck and Verkuilen (2002).

⁶ SIP = Scalar Index of Politics, MIRPS = Multidimensional Institutional Representation of Political Systems (Gates et al. 2006).

⁷ Most of the analyses have also been tested on the more restrictive measure of 1,000 or more battle-deaths in a year (which is defined as 'war' in this dataset as well as in the Correlates of War data). Generally, the results are very similar, so we do not comment in detail on the alternative analyses.

ocratic while the neighbors are non-democratic. We include this variable and its square in the analyses below. The square term ranges from 0 to 1 and reflects the difference between the level of democracy in the country and among its neighbors.

Data on election dates are from (Strand 2006: Ch. 8). Our expectation, in line with the finding of Bates et al. (2003), is that violence is most likely in connection with the first election in a new political regime where the incumbent government is at risk of losing office. We will therefore include two election measures. One variable measures the proximity to the election that provides the first test of the new regime, and the other variable measures proximity to any other election. Data on presidentialism, proportional representation, and federalism are scored according to Schneider and Wiesehomeier (2005), partially based on data from Golder (2005). For economic development and population we use data from Penn World Tables, but in order to reduce missing data problems, we use the expanded data from Gleditsch (2002b). Both of these indicators are lagged one year and log-transformed. The data on ethno-linguistic fractionalization were collected by Roeder (2001). For the oil dependency variable, we use data from Fearon and Laitin (2003).

Analysis

We start by a bivariate analysis of the relationship between the various democracy variables and four measures of armed conflict: onset, incidence, duration, and severity (Table I). All figures are in ratio form and roughly comparable. These ratios tell us how many times better or worse democracies perform in comparison to other regimes. The column labeled “onset” provides estimates of the relative risk of onset of armed conflict – the estimated probability of onset of conflict when the explanatory variable is at a value $X_1=X_0+1$ divided by the estimated probability when the variable is at X_0 . For variables that range from 0 to 1, this is the same as the risk when the variable is at its maximum divided by when it is at its minimum. The column labeled “incidence” give estimated ratios of the odds of a country being involved in a conflict in a given year. The column labeled “duration” gives an estimate of relative durability of a conflict given that it has started. The column labeled “severity” reports the estimated ratio of the number of *annual* battle deaths during the

war when the explanatory variable is at its maximum divided by the number of deaths when it is at its minimum.⁸ For the incidence, duration, and severity analyses, variables are measured independently for every ongoing year of conflict.

Table I in about here

The bivariate results are very favorable regarding the effects of democratic governance. The first line shows the ratios for countries with maximum Polity IV score as compared to countries with minimum Polity score. The .61 estimate in the “onset” column shows that democracies are 39% less likely to experience a civil war onset than autocracies. The .95 estimate in the “incidence” column reflects that they are 5% less likely to be in a state of civil war at a given point in time. However, once a conflict has erupted in a democracy, it tends to persist. In fact, democracies experience conflicts that are almost four times longer than do autocracies. On the other hand, the “severity” column shows that conflicts in democracies are less intense – in each year of the conflict, they claim only a third of the number of victims as similar conflicts in non-democracies. Overall, armed conflicts in democracies would seem to claim about as many lives as conflicts in non-democracies, but they are spread out over a much longer period. This observation does not imply that as many people have been killed in democracies as in non-democracies. Keeping in mind that armed conflicts are much less common in democracies than other regimes, we can still conclude that inhabitants in democracies are generally safer. Indeed when we look at the period 1946–2002, we find that fatalities in non-

⁸ The relative risk of onset estimates were obtained using bivariate Cox regression with calendar time as the time variable (see Raknerud and Hegre 1997 and Hegre et al. 2001 for a complete description). The odds of incidence ratios were estimated using logistic regression on a country-year dataset. The estimated relative risk of conflict termination was obtained using Weibull regression on a conflict duration dataset, using duration time as time variable. The estimated battle deaths ratios were obtained by estimating an OLS model with log battle deaths as the dependent variable, and taking the anti-log of the estimated coefficient. Full documentation of the design of the statistical tests is given in an appendix that will be released with the replication data (Strand 2007).

democracies exceed those in democracies by three to one. All ratios are significantly different from 1.

The second line in Table I shows similar results for the square of the Polity IV index. The index was squared and rescaled such that the squared index ranges from 0 (for the midpoint) to 1 (for the endpoints of the Polity scale). The ratios presented therefore compare the endpoints of the Polity scale to the mean. We see that the inverted U-curve is strong and robust in a bivariate model, both for “onset” and for “incidence”: Consistent democracies and autocracies are 78% less likely to have conflict onset and 70% less likely to be at war at any given time. Consistent autocracies and democracies also have longer wars than the inconsistent regime types, but this result is not statistically significant. Finally, inconsistent regimes have three times more lethal wars than pure autocracies and democracies.

Lines 3 and 4 present the same set of results using the SIP democracy index from the MIRPS project. The SIP index avoids the endogeneity problem in Polity by replacing the participation component of Polity with the corresponding element of Vanhanen’s Polyarchy index. Hence, this index is not affected by the “factionalism” problem in Polity. The results for the SIP index (line 3) are roughly the same as for the Polity index. The results for the SIP democracy index squared, however (line 4) are clearly weaker than the corresponding for the Polity index. The exception is the duration analysis, where we find inconsistent regimes to have almost five times longer wars than consistent ones. Overall, in a bivariate analysis, there seems to be significant support for an inverted U-shaped relationship.

Both Polity and MIRPS combine information on how political power is gathered and how it can be used. Vanhanen’s Polyarchy dataset focuses exclusively on how power is won, through observing election outcomes. The Polyarchy Index of Democracy is the product of electoral participation and competition. Using this indicator of democracy, we find a very strong support for both a linear and curvilinear relationship between democracy and onset, incidence and severity, but weaker results for duration. When we use the Freedom House indicator, whose particular strength is to measure how political power is used, we find fairly similar results. The one clear difference is that there is no curvilinear relationship between democ-

racy and severity. The Freedom House scores are partly based on freedom from “acts of violence or terror due to civil conflict or war”, which makes this dataset, too, biased in favor of our hypothesis (Freedom House, 2006).

Table I shows that the bivariate relationship between level of democracy and onset of conflict is very robust across different definitions of democracy: Democracies experience fewer conflict onsets than other regimes. Once conflicts occur, they are less brutal in democracies than in other regimes. Figure 1 shows the bivariate relationship between regime type and civil war, with the size of the circles indicating the severity of the conflict, plotted on a background of a tripartite division of regime type. Many of these conflicts have gone on for a long time but most of them have claimed relatively few lives⁹. Using Polity and MIRPS, we find that autocracies experience the longest conflicts, but these findings are not supported by Polyarchy or Freedom House. There are aspects of the latter two datasets that weakens our confidence in them. First, Vanhanen’s dataset does not take into consideration how much power the executive has once it is won. This limits its ability to discriminate between liberal and illiberal democracies, and it is this distinction in particular that, according to our theory, makes democracies less capable of fighting rebellions. The Freedom House dataset is only available from 1973, while the other datasets span the whole period 1950–2000. This creates a particular problem for duration analysis, since the most durable conflicts, which started early in the period, are excluded. Thus, the conflicts analyzed with the Freedom House data are a sample of shorter conflicts and therefore not representative. These problems, and the fact that regime changes are not dated in these datasets¹⁰, make Polyarchy and Freedom House less suited for our purpose. We will not use these indicators in our multivariate analyses.

Proximity to regime change is measured using a decay function. This function assumes that the negative impact of a regime change is at its peak immediately after the change takes place, after which it diminishes at a constant rate over time. The decay function is therefore always 1 when time since last regime change is 0

⁹ Major exceptions being Sri Lanka and Turkey. For details, see the Appendix.

¹⁰ See the unpublished appendix posted with the replication data (Strand 2007) for an explanation of why this is problematic.

(i.e. the day before), and the decay takes the value 0 when the time since last regime change is infinitely long. The attenuation rate is determined by the half-life parameter, which in this analysis we have set to 4 years. Thus, four years after a regime change, the risk of conflict is 50% of the original risk stemming from the regime change. After 8 years, it is 25%, after 12 years 12.5%, etc. Whereas regime change does seem unrelated to the chances that a conflict ends, it is clearly related to the risk of its onset. Regimes that recently have experienced a regime change are 2.5 times more likely to see a conflict than regimes that have remained unchanged for several years. Regime changes also lead to a doubling in the violence levels. The incidence of conflict is also increased, but given the insignificant effect on duration this effect seemingly stems from the increased risk of experiencing a new conflict rather than the prolongation of present conflicts.

The nature of the political systems in the immediate neighborhood is clearly also important. We do not find a particular high risk of war onset in countries that have political systems that are different from the systems in the immediate neighborhood.¹¹ Just as we find an effect of level of democracy on duration, however, we find that if a country is considerably more democratic than its neighborhood the duration of armed conflict increases by a factor of 4. We also find that the incidence of conflict is 29% higher for countries in heterogeneous neighborhoods than for those in homogenous ones. On the other hand, wars are less intense than wars in homogenous neighborhoods if the country is more democratic than its neighbors. Countries that are politically different from their neighborhood also have less lethal wars. This result cannot be explained by the level of democracy in the country itself, however, since the square of the political difference is also significantly less than 1. Wars that take place in a country with a political system different from its neighborhood lead to only one sixth of the annual fatalities compared to wars in politically similar neighborhoods. This applies regardless of whether the country in question is very democratic or autocratic.

¹¹ In an analysis not reported in detail here, we find that a country – irrespective of its domestic system – in an all-democratic neighborhood has a 62% lower risk of conflict onset than a country in an all-autocratic environment. Indeed, the effect of living in a democratic neighborhood seems stronger than the effect of being a democratic country.

Among democracies, parliamentary systems experience more severe wars than both presidential and mixed systems. Proportional representation systems have a lower risk of war onset and may be less lethal, but there are indications that they last longer than majoritarian systems. Finally, countries with federal systems have a higher risk of war onset than centralized systems.

Our earlier research has shown that inconsistent regimes are considerably less stable than consistent regimes. Therefore, we need to assess whether or not the inverted U holds up when we control for proximity of regime change. In Table II, the first line repeats the bivariate results for conflict onset from Table I. The second line shows the bivariate relative risk when controlling for “proximity of regime change”. Controlling for political stability does not eradicate the effect of democracy on conflict onset, contrary to the results in Vreeland (2008), but the effect for the inverted U is somewhat weaker. A politically different neighborhood now increases the risk of civil war onset. Since democratization is contagious (Gleditsch and Ward, 2006), this effect may imply that the most stubborn political regimes are toppled violently. An example of this is the transition to democracy in Rumania in 1989, which occurred after the transitions in the neighboring countries and became quite violent.

Table II in about here

The next two lines in Table II investigate the hypothesis in Hegre (2003) that the effect of democracy is dependent on the level of development by estimating the relative risk of onset of conflict separately for high-income and low-income countries (defined as having an average income of less than \$5,500 per year in real 1995 US dollars). Line 3 shows that the relationship between democracy and democracy squared is very strong for developed countries. The relationship is much weaker and not significant in low-income countries. The neighborhood and election variables have strong but insignificant coefficients in the high-development sample, which means that the trivariate model is not very precise. The coefficients are smaller for the low-development sample, where there is some evidence of a neighborhood effect but no effect from proximity to elections.

Buhaug (2006) and Buhaug and Rød (2006) report that conflicts over government have different causes than territorial conflicts. In lines 5 and 6, we reproduce their finding by estimating the bivariate relationship separately for the two types of conflicts. Whereas the danger of governmental conflicts clearly depends on the level of democracy of the regime, there are no connections between the two democracy indicators and territorial conflict. The difference in the political neighborhood, on the other hand, strongly increases the likelihood of a territorial conflict, but not governmental conflict.

Finally, the argument that the absence of democratic institutions has become a more important predictor of conflict after the Cold War, receives support in lines 7 and 8. For the post-Cold War period, the bivariate relationships between our democracy variables and conflict are very strong. Moreover, the difference to the political system in the neighborhood increases the risk of war onset strongly after the Cold War. The results for the Cold War period are weaker and not as significant, except for proximity to elections. Here, we are probably capturing an effect of political instability in former colonies.

In the analysis reported in Table III, we add several control variables that might both explain levels and stability of democracy. In the table, we only report the estimated coefficients for the democracy variables – these should be interpreted as risk or severity ratios *contingent* on the control variables. (Tables IV and V report the full set of results for some of the onset and severity models.)

Table III in about here

The results in Table I indicated that there are strong bivariate effects between democracy and armed conflict. The contingent relationships in Table III are generally considerably weaker. In fact, only the squared democracy variables are significantly associated with the risk of civil war onset, and none of the indicators are related to duration. From this we can claim weak support for the hypothesis that semidemocracies have a higher risk of conflict and that regional differences also play a role in increasing this risk. The contingent relationships with war severity, on the other hand, are strong and generally in the predicted direction. Both proximity variables (regime change and election) are reported to have some effect on the risk of conflict, but these findings are not significant. Both of these factors are related to political instability, and it is premature to use the lack of significance as an argument against their importance. We will return to this point later.

As is evident in Table IV below, low economic development is a strong predictor of armed conflict. We also know from other studies that economic development is strongly associated with stable democratic governance (e.g., Gates et al. 2006). Highly developed countries tend to be democracies and peaceful. This explains why there is no relationship between democracy and onset or incidence in Table III: The peaceful quality of democracies may be due to their status as highly developed rather than as democracies. We saw in Table II that the effect of political regimes is much stronger in developed countries. Hegre (2003) finds this to be true, even when controlling for other variables.

The results in Table III give us two different versions of the inverted U-curve between conflict and democracy. Using the Polity IV dataset, we find evidence of an inverted U-curve regarding *onset* of conflict. The contingent relative risk of conflict in very democratic or very autocratic countries is .42 or 58% lower than in a com-

parable semi-democracy. As noted, this relationship is partly explained by the coding of “factionalism” in Polity. The same effect, using the SIP dataset, is 42%. The difference between these two findings is due to the endogenous component of the Polity dataset. We find no evidence supporting the hypothesis that democracies are less at risk than other regimes, nor does the analysis support a claim that their wars are longer.

For both democracy measures, the results are weaker when we look at incidence than at onset, i.e. the coefficient for the squared term for democracy is closer to one. As noted, incidence includes aspects of both onset and duration. Semi-democracies experience fewer conflicts but their conflicts are more durable when they occur. These two effects pull in opposite directions, and the net effect is indeterminate.

We saw in Table I that democracies are associated with less intense conflicts, confirming the results in Lacina (2006). In Table III, the annual level of battle-related fatalities is 45–60% lower *per year* for conflicts in democracies than in autocracies, even when we take into account population size. In the multivariate analysis, there is only weak evidence that democracies or inconsistent regimes have longer wars than non-democracies. The analysis clearly shows that the average democratic conflict is less violent than the average conflict in a non-democratic country.

The effect of the political difference with the neighborhood is greatly reduced when we take into account the control variables, including the level of democracy in the country in question. The “political difference squared” is estimated to increase the incidence of conflict but, as noted in the bivariate analysis, it tends to strongly reduce its severity.

Comparing different democratic regimes, we find no real differences between onset ratios, but the duration and severity analyses seem to echo the initial comparison of democracies and autocracies. Presidential regimes have more violent conflicts. In countries with proportional representation, the conflicts tend to last longer, but they are less violent per year than conflicts in majoritarian systems. Since the conflicts are longer, the incidence of conflict is higher in parliamentary systems. The findings for federalism disappear when we add control variables (country size is particularly important here). Wars in federal democracies seem to be shorter than in centralized systems, and this tendency is strong enough to be reflected in a significant estimate in the incidence analysis.

Summarizing the results from Table III, we conclude that most of the bivariate effects reported in Table I do not hold up when introducing control variables. However, given that a conflict has erupted, there seems to be strong and persistent effect from political regimes on the severity of the conflict. Democracies tend to experience more protracted conflicts, but this finding is not significant. On the other hand, democracies have clearly less violent wars. We discuss this finding in more detail below.

Several studies of the causes of conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003, Hegre et al. 2001) report an effect from political instability, which seems to contradict the findings reported in Table III. Table IV presents a more nuanced result, indicating strong support for the hypothesis that political instability is related to conflict but agnostic to the correct operationalization of this concept. The figures reported are the results from a full, multivariate analysis of onset of armed conflict.

Table IV in about here

The figures in Table III are based on Model 1, where we see that the inverted U-curve receives a fair measure of support while neither regime change nor election proximity is significant. However, a third measure of political instability, proximity to independence, is strong and significant. Proximity to regime change and proximity to independence share the same causal logic. It is the unconsolidated nature of the political regime that is the key factor explaining the onset of conflict. A final proxy for political instability is the institutional difference from the neighborhood. Gates, et al. (2006) provide evidence for a strong destabilizing effect from such political isolation. As argued earlier, this can be a consequence of the spatial clustering of regime changes. As a proxy for political instability, it differs somewhat from the other measures, as it captures the potential for regime change as much as change that has already taken place. Squared difference from political neighborhood has a quite strong and robust effect on the relative risk of conflict.

In Model 2 we remove the competing operationalizations of political instability, resulting in a stronger and significant effect from proximity to regime change. This effect provides good support for our hypothesis of a relationship between political instability and conflict, and it is supportive of the argument made above. Political instability has an effect, but it is unclear through which variables this manifests itself.

To investigate this claim further, we use the robustness checks introduced in Strand (2006: Ch. 4). In the analysis reported so far, we have coded a new onset whenever the conflict was inactive for more than two whole calendar years. Inevitably, this includes a number of onsets that are commonly interpreted as a continuation and direct consequence of the previous conflict period. In Model 3, we re-analyze our data with a stricter requirement: new onsets are recorded only after eight years of inactivity. In Model 4, we include only those conflicts that exceed a total 1,000 battle-related deaths.

These robustness checks provide clear support for the instability hypothesis. With the stricter onset requirement (Model 3), we find that proximity to both independence and succeeding regime changes are significant contributors to risk of conflict. The inverted U-curve is present as well. However, neither elections nor difference from neighborhood are significantly associated with increase of risk in this

model, although the coefficient for difference from neighborhood is almost as strong as in Model 1.

When we focus on conflicts that exceed 1,000 battle-related deaths (Model 4), proximity to regime change has almost exactly the same effect as in Model 3, but the uncertainty increases to just above the limit of significance. The substantive effect remains the same. On the other hand, proximity to independence is reduced from being very influential to an insignificant factor. Proximity to election is a very potent predictor in Model 4, in contrast to the other models. As expected, it is the first election in a political regime under the initial government that significantly increases the risk of conflict. Since this election very often comes in the initial period of a new political regime, this variable and proximity to regime change can be seen as measuring almost the same thing. The election variable is more sensitive to time and the effect of an election is quickly reduced, whereas the proximity to regime change variable is much more persistent. Both are decay functions, but have half-life values of 6 months and 2.9 years respectively. However, they are both measures of political stability, and Model 4 further strengthens our hypothesis.

Table V shows correspondingly detailed results for models with severity as the dependent variable. The unit of analysis is a conflict-year, and the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the estimated number of battle deaths in that conflict-year. We include the lagged dependent variable in the model. If the year before the year of observation was a peace year, we set $\ln(\text{battle deaths})$ to 0. The interpretation of the estimates therefore indicates the change in battle deaths from the previous year. The estimates are exponentiated to be comparable to the risk and odds ratios presented earlier. The estimate for the SIP democracy index signifies that given last year's severity and the values for the other control variables, a war in a democracy on average has 55% of the fatalities in an average autocracy.

Table V in about here

In Model 1 we use Polity, while in Model 2 we use the SIP index. We find a strong conflict-dampening effect of democracy for both measures. Since the main term is smaller than 1 in both models, there is no inverted U-relationship here. The estimated relationship is stronger for the Polity index than for the SIP index, however.

The effects of the control variables are remarkably similar to those found in the onset analysis. The same factors that increase the risk of a war onset, contribute to making the war more severe. A regime change during a war increase the expected number of fatalities with 33–63% in the first year. As before, this effect is assumed to decrease thereafter at a constant rate with a half-life of 1 year. Wars that occur in politically different neighborhoods are less lethal than wars in similar

neighborhoods, but this does not apply if the difference is positive, i.e. for democracies in non-democratic neighborhoods. Ethno-linguistic fractionalization reduces the severity of wars, possibly because coordination problems in both armies reduce their efficiency and scope. Wars in high-income countries are less intense than in low-income countries, and oil exporters have more violent wars than countries with comparable incomes derived from other sources. The population variable is not significant. This difference from the onset analysis is probably because population has a smaller variance in the war sample than in the full sample, and that much of the population effect is taken up by the lagged dependent variable.

Conclusion

The overall question asked in this chapter is whether democracies experience less conflict than other regimes. “Less conflict” may refer not only to fewer conflicts, but also shorter and less violent conflicts. We formulated ten hypotheses to test the relationship between democracy and civil war in detail. In general, we obtain well-defined results for our analysis of the severity of war, and somewhat less conclusive ones for the study of the risk of onset. As in earlier statistical studies of civil war, our results for the duration of civil war tend to be the least conclusive. When the onset and duration analyses indicate that variables predict both frequent and long civil wars corresponding analyses also show a high incidence incidence of war.

Democracies experience fewer conflicts than other regimes (Hypothesis 1), but this effect seems to be caused by the fact that democracies also tend to enjoy other pacifying qualities. In particular, most democracies are high-income countries with stable institutions. Controlling for other factors, we find no linear relationship between democracy and the risk of conflict onset. We find some support for a curvilinear effect indicating that semi-democracies are more at risk of experiencing conflict, but it is not entirely robust to our choice of democracy indicator (Hypothesis 2). When democracies have wars, however, they are clearly less violent than wars in comparable non-democracies. This relationship appears to be monotonic – inconsistent democracies may have a higher risk of civil wars, but they are on average not as violent as those in non-democracies.

We find solid evidence for a general relationship between political instability and conflict, but we find no single, robust operationalization of political instability. We do not find evidence supporting the hypothesis that the inverted U-curve relationship is exclusively due to the inherent instability of semi-democratic regimes (Hypotheses 3 and 4). On the contrary, the inverted U-curve is robust when we control for political instability. However, when we control for other factors that are also related to political instability, the inverted U-curve is somewhat more fragile than the effect of instability in onset studies.

We do not find support for a bivariate relationship between elections and civil war but when controlling for other factors, the first “real” election in a new political regime appear to have a partial effect (Hypothesis 5). The effect of proximity to elections seems to be part of the political instability-conflict nexus.

We find evidence that the effect of democracy is much stronger when we look at governmental conflicts compared with secessionist conflicts (Hypothesis 6), and that the bivariate pacifying effect of democracy does not hold for low-development countries (Hypothesis 7). We also study in detail the importance of the political institutions in the neighborhood. When controlling for other factors, there does not seem to be a robust association between neighborhood and the onset, incidence, and duration of wars. We do find clear evidence that civil wars in non-democracies that are located in democratic neighborhoods are considerably less violent than in other non-democracies. This is due to the level of democracy among the neighbors rather than the political difference in itself, since we do not find a corresponding effect of difference for democracies located in non-democratic neighborhoods (Hypothesis 8).

We have also explored differences between different democratic institutions. Again, the results are much more conclusive for the severity analysis than for the other aspects of war. As expected, presidential systems seem more violent than parliamentary ones, and majoritarian systems more violent than those with proportional representation – but the latter may have longer wars.

Finally, we find that the effect of democracy has become much more important after the Cold War (Hypothesis 10).

Overall, we confirm that democracy is strongly related to various aspects of civil war. Both level and stability of democracy contribute to the risk of conflict, but once conflict has erupted, political institutions do not explain the duration of conflict. We find strong effects from democracy on the severity of conflict. Our results, except for severity, are much weaker when we include control variables. Factors that are known to contribute to democracy and democratic stability also robustly contribute to peace, indicating that part of the relationship is spurious. Better theory is needed to sort out the multivariate relationships and the role played by the system of governance. Future research should explore how democracy, democratic stability, and peace interact and strengthen each other.

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Table I. Democracy and Four Measures of Civil War, 1950–2000

	Onset	Incidence	Duration	Severity
Polity IV democracy-autocracy index	0.60 **	0.95	3.61 ***	0.37 ***
Polity IV democracy-autocracy index squared	0.22 ***	0.30 ***	1.40	0.37 ***
SIP democracy index	0.53 ***	0.90	2.80 **	0.41 ***
SIP democracy index squared	0.41 ***	0.70 ***	3.66 **	0.44 ***
Vanhanen index of democracy	0.24 ***	0.49 ***	4.06	0.21 ***
Vanhanen ID, squared	0.005 ***	0.072 ***	1.81	0.059 ***
Freedom House index	0.34 ***	0.38 ***	2.06	0.28 ***
Freedom House index squared	0.44 ***	0.51 ***	0.64	1.19
Proximity of regime change	2.61 ***	2.17 ***	0.76	2.02 ***
Proximity of election	1.15	0.88	1.70	0.75 **
Difference to political system in neighborhood	0.75	1.29 **	3.78 ***	0.52 ***
Difference squared	1.84	2.77 ***	1.22	0.17 ***
Presidentialism	0.96	1.44 ***	0.50	1.79 ***
Proportional representation	0.32 ***	0.70 ***	2.66	0.76 *
Federalism	2.56 ***	0.69 **	1.35	1.08

The figures for the onset and incidence columns are relative risk ratios; the figures for duration are time ratios; and the figures for severity are casualty ratios. The estimates are based on a dataset with 159 countries and 204 civil wars (corresponding to 5,848 country-years). Within each column, all analyses are based on the same set of countries and conflicts. The exceptions are in the final three columns, which are restricted to 49 wars in 93 democracies (2,366 country-years). For all analyses, we removed observations with missing information for the control variables to make the results immediately comparable to those reported in Table IV.

*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Here and in the subsequent tables we report two-sided tests of the hypothesis that the exponent of the coefficient is not equal to one. See Appendix with the replication data for the details and also Strand (2007).

Table II. The inverted U, Controlling for Four Single Control Variables, Onset of Civil War, 1950–2000

	Democracy	Democra- cy squared	Squared difference to political system in neighborhood	Proximity to elections
Bivariate results (159/204)	0.53 ***	0.41 ***	0.75	1.15
Control for political sta- bility	0.59 ***	0.52 **	2.42 **	1.67
High level of development	0.30 **	0.08 ***	4.54	4.54
Low level of development	0.92	0.76	1.99 *	1.91
Governmental conflict	0.41 ***	0.30 ***	0.74	2.09
Territorial conflict	0.85	0.58	8.40 ***	2.56
Cold War	0.79	0.60	1.57	2.66 *
Post-Cold War	0.34 ***	0.24 ***	5.03 ***	1.94

All results, except the first line (which is copied from Table I) are based on trivariate models of onset. All figures are relative risk ratios estimated using calendar-time Cox regression. The estimates are based on a dataset with 159 countries and 204 civil wars. Within each column, all analyses are based on the same set of countries and conflicts. In the analyses in the last six lines this dataset are divided into three pairs of sub-samples. The high-development subset has 25 wars in 80 countries. The governmental subset has 119 wars in 159 countries. The Cold War subset has 122 wars in 138 countries. Democracy is measured by the SIP index.

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$, based on two-sided tests of the hypothesis that the exponent of the coefficient is not equal to one.

Table III. Democracy and Civil War, with Control Variables, 1950–2000

	Onset	Incidence	Duration	Severity
with Polity				
Democracy	0.90	0.82	2.06	0.40 ***
Democracy squared	0.42 ***	0.53 ***	0.98	0.52 ***
with SIP				
Democracy	0.80	0.73	1.23	0.55 ***
Democracy squared	0.58 *	0.79	2.29	0.95
Proximity of regime change	1.35	1.06	1.10	1.63 ***
Proximity of election	1.58	1.13	1.95	0.88
Difference to political system in neighborhood	1.26	1.49	1.93	1.41
Difference squared	2.38 *	2.60 **	0.12	0.29 ***
Presidentialism	0.57	0.62	0.48	2.40 ***
Proportional representation	1.002	2.39 **	10.55 **	0.48 ***
Federalism	0.57	0.32 **	0.25	2.67 **

The figures in the onset and incidence column are relative risk ratios, the figures for duration are time ratios, and the figures for severity are casualty ratios. The full set of control variables (results not reported in the table) is found in Table IV and described in more detail in Strand (2007). The estimates are based on a dataset with 159 countries and 204 civil wars (corresponding to 5,848 country-years). Within each column, all analyses are based on the same set of countries and conflicts. The exceptions are in the final three columns, which are restricted to 49 wars in 93 democracies (2,366 country-years).

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$, based on two-sided tests of the hypothesis that the exponent of the coefficient not being equal to one.

Table IV. The Correlates of Internal Armed Conflict Onset, Hazard Ratios. Multivariate Results with Control Variables, 1950–2000

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
SIP	0.802	1.115	1.207	0.719
	(-0.581)	(0.415)	(0.473)	(-0.619)
SIP squared	0.576*	0.642	0.520**	0.509*
	(-1.880)	(-1.551)	(-1.975)	(-1.784)
Proximity to regime change	1.351	1.590*	1.730*	1.699
	(1.039)	(1.696)	(1.740)	(1.614)
Proximity to independence	2.792**		2.909**	1.419
	(2.312)		(1.981)	(0.533)
Proximity to first real election	1.577		1.157	3.035**
	(1.077)		(0.345)	(2.391)
Proximity to other elections	0.925		0.983	1.119
	(-0.230)		(0.015)	(0.224)
Democratic difference	1.262		1.030	1.046
	(0.636)		(0.085)	(0.098)
Democratic difference squared	2.377*		2.060	1.676
	(1.711)		(1.110)	(0.693)
Average income (ln)	0.664***	0.637***	0.622***	0.686**
	(-3.488)	(-3.948)	(-3.603)	(-2.564)
Population (ln)	1.340***	1.325***	1.287***	1.232***
	(4.898)	(4.586)	(3.322)	(3.267)
Proximity to conflict	3.678***	3.465***	1.752***	7.163***
	(6.308)	(5.948)	(2.287)	(7.579)
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization	2.220**	2.327**	2.087*	1.734
	(2.466)	(2.558)	(1.930)	(1.458)
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization squared	0.046**	0.044**	0.099*	0.031**
	(-2.435)	(-2.493)	(-1.718)	(-2.126)
Oil exporter	1.665**	1.706**	1.770**	1.800*
	(2.005)	(2.089)	(2.182)	(1.761)
Log likelihood	-875.98	-881.07	-695.17	-501.46
Log likelihood null model	-983.92	-983.92	-754.29	-579.66
N	25,972	25,972	19,537	14,801
Number of countries	159	159	159	159
Number of civil wars	204	204	157	121

Model 3 excludes intermittent conflicts. Model 4 includes only conflicts with more than 1,000 battle deaths. The figures reported are relative risk ratios, with z-scores in parentheses. N refers to the number of snapshots analyzed. At each of the 204 onsets, all countries independent at that moment are observed. Since a number of the 159 countries included in our study gained their independence after 1945, our N is lower than 31,959 (204 * 159).


*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, based on two-sided tests of the hypothesis that the exponent of the coefficient is not equal to one.

Table V. Correlates of the Severity of Internal Armed Conflict, Ratios. Multivariate Results with Control Variables, 1950–2000

	Model 1	Model 2
Lagged dependent variable (ln)	1.38***	1.39***
	(19.22)	(19.46)
Polity IV	0.40***	
	(-3.53)	
Polity IV squared	0.52***	
	(-3.34)	
SIP democracy index		0.55***
		(-2.29)
SIP democracy index squared		0.95
		(-0.28)
Difference to political system in neighborhood	1.76**	1.41
	(2.41)	(1.37)
Difference squared	0.39***	0.29***
	(-2.69)	(-3.39)
Proximity to regime change	1.33*	1.63***
	(1.85)	(3.16)
Average income (ln)	0.85***	0.84***
	(-3.30)	(-3.29)
Population (ln)	1.04	1.03
	(0.87)	(0.67)
Election year	0.88	0.88
	(-1.02)	(-0.97)
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization	1.17	1.34
	(1.28)	(1.28)
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization squared	0.033***	0.042***
	(-4.15)	(-3.76)
Oil exporter (>1/3 of total exports)	1.35**	1.40**
	(2.09)	(2.30)
Log likelihood	-1,547.39	-1,595.93
Log likelihood null model	-1,771.30	-1,817.57
Number of country-years	877	897

The figures reported are exponentiated coefficients, to be interpreted as ratios relative to the baseline, with t-scores in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$, based on two-sided tests of the hypothesis that the exponent of the coefficient is not equal to one.

Figure 1. Regime Type and the Severity of Civil War, 1989–2004

Conflict data from the Uppsala/PRIO conflict data (Gleditsch et al. 2002), battle deaths from Lacin and Gleditsch (2005), and regime type data from Gates, Hegre, Jones, and Strand (2006) with some additions for countries with missing scores in their dataset. Countries coded as democracies and autocracies have had stable regime types (democracy = SIP index > 0.80, autocracy = SIP < 0.25). All others – including politically unstable countries and countries stably located in the middle of the scale – are coded as semi-democracies. For the distinction between conflicts over government and territory, see Buhaug (2006). The dots and asterisks are placed at the center of the conflict zone (Buhaug and Gates 2002). The larger the dot or asterisk, the greater the cumulative number of battle deaths over this 16-year period. Only conflicts active during this period have been included. The definitions and time span used in this figure differs marginally from that used in the analysis due for practical reasons.

Appendix: Democracies with internal armed conflict, 1950–2000

In this article, we use the Uppsala/PRIO dataset to test the hypotheses about civil war and democracy. This dataset is updated annually and published in *Journal of Peace Research* (no. 5), and posted on www.prio.no/csw/armedconflict. In this article we use the conflict data for the period 1950–2000. For the severity of conflict, we use the Lacina battle deaths dataset, posted on www.prio.no/csw/cross/battledeaths cf. Lacina & Gleditsch (2005).

During the period 1950–2000 there were 199 internal armed conflicts. This figure assumes that when a conflict has been inactive (i.e. has had fewer than 25 battle deaths) for more than 10 years or is conducted by new actors, we define it as a new conflict.

Below, we list the 52 internal armed conflicts during this period which partly or completely occurred in a democracy. The conflicts are labeled with the name of the country and in the case of territorial conflicts with the name of the territory. The information provided is their start and end dates; the duration (measured in days); the percentage of these days fought under a democratic form of governance; the regime type at the onset of the conflict (autocratic, semi-democratic, or democratic); and finally the best estimate for the total number of battle-related fatalities which occurred during a democratic form of governance.

Country	Incompatibility	Start	End	Duration	% democratic	Regime type at onset	Severity
Argentina	Government	01 Mar 73	31 Dec 77	1,767	62.8 %	Aut	1,361
Bangladesh	Terr: Chittagong Hill Tracts	15 Aug 75	02 Dec 97	8,146	27.7 %	Semi-dem	175
Burma	Government	28 Mar 48	31 Dec 94	15,959	13.4 %	Semi-dem	1,284
Burma	Terr: Arakan	04 Jan 48	31 Dec 94	15,968	13.4 %	Semi-dem	146
Burma	Terr: Kachin	31 Dec 61	31 Dec 92	11,324	0.5 %	Dem	1,164
Burma	Terr: Karen	31 Jan 49	31 Dec 00	18,018	11.9 %	Semi-dem	1,284
Burma	Terr: Karenni	01 Jan 57	31 Dec 57	365	100.0 %	Dem	290
Burma	Terr: Mon	04 Jan 48	15 Nov 63	5,795	36.9 %	Semi-dem	321
Burma	Terr: Shan	30 Nov 59	31 Dec 00	11,617	7.1 %	Dem	241
Colombia	Government	16 Aug 66	31 Dec 00	12,557	76.8 %	Semi-dem	19,779
Congo	Government	03 Nov 93	16 Nov 99	985	22.5 %	Dem	5,660
El Salvador	Government	01 Oct 79	31 Dec 91	4,475	61.9 %	Semi-dem	24,392
Gambia	Government	30 Jul 81	06 Aug 81	8	100.0 %	Dem	650
Guatemala	Government	01 Oct 66	31 Dec 00	12,511	14.6 %	Semi-dem	125
India	Government	25 May 67	19 Jul 72	1,883	100.0 %	Dem	300
India	Government	10 Oct 90	31 Dec 00	3,736	100.0 %	Dem	1,658
India	Terr: Assam	29 May 90	31 Dec 00	3,125	100.0 %	Dem	1,905
India	Terr: Bodoland	16 Mar 89	31 Dec 00	3,578	100.0 %	Dem	250
India	Terr: Kashmir	11 Dec 89	31 Dec 00	4,039	100.0 %	Dem	18,360
India	Terr: Manipur	31 Jul 82	31 Dec 00	5,634	100.0 %	Dem	925
India	Terr: Mizoram	01 Sep 66	31 Oct 68	792	100.0 %	Dem	1,500
India	Terr: Nagaland	01 Jan 56	30 Jun 68	4,565	100.0 %	Dem	2,078
India	Terr: Nagaland	31 Jul 92	31 Dec 00	2,184	100.0 %	Dem	245
India	Terr: Punjab/Khalistan	20 Aug 83	12 Sep 93	3,677	100.0 %	Dem	18,875
India	Terr: Tripura	01 Jan 78	31 Dec 00	6,880	100.0 %	Dem	1,097
Indonesia	Terr: Aceh	08 Sep 90	31 Dec 00	1,027	42.6 %	Aut	349
Israel	Terr: Palestine	01 Jan 49	31 Dec 00	18,993	99.9 %	Semi-dem	13,175

Lesotho	Government	23 Sep 98	14 Oct 98	22	100.0 %	Dem	107
Malaysia	Government	01 Jan 58	31 Jul 60	943	36.9 %	Semi-dem	22
Malaysia	Terr: North Borneo	01 Jan 63	11 Aug 66	1, 319	100.0 %	Dem	400
Niger	Terr: Air and Azawad	01 Oct 92	27 Nov 97	910	80.8 %	Transitional	59
Pakistan	Government	01 Jun 90	31 Mar 96	670	100.0 %	Dem	2, 525
Pakistan	Terr: Baluchistan	01 Jan 74	05 Jul 77	1, 282	100.0 %	Dem	8, 332
Papua New Guinea	Terr: Bougainville	01 Dec 89	31 Dec 96	2, 588	100.0 %	Dem	375
Peru	Government	01 Oct 65	31 Jan 66	123	100.0 %	Dem	138
Peru	Government	22 Aug 82	31 Dec 99	6, 341	55.4 %	Dem	23, 433
Philippines	Government	04 Jul 46	17 May 54	2, 875	49.3 %	Semi-dem	4, 504
Philippines	Government	21 Sep 72	31 Dec 00	10, 329	49.2 %	Semi-dem	7, 619
Philippines	Terr: Mindanao	20 Aug 70	31 Dec 00	9, 996	39.9 %	Semi-dem	5, 814
Senegal	Terr: Casamance	01 Jun 90	31 Dec 00	3, 867	7.4 %	Semi-dem	39
Spain	Terr: Basque	01 Jan 80	31 Dec 92	1, 827	100.0 %	Dem	245
Sri Lanka	Government	30 Apr 71	09 Jun 71	41	100.0 %	Dem	1, 630
Sri Lanka	Government	01 Feb 89	28 Feb 90	393	100.0 %	Dem	5, 025
Sri Lanka	Terr: Eelam	01 Jul 83	31 Dec 00	6, 394	100.0 %	Dem	53, 975
Sudan	Government	01 Jan 63	31 Jan 72	3, 318	11.7 %	Aut	2, 395
Sudan	Government	16 May 83	31 Dec 00	6, 440	18.4 %	Aut	12, 975
Trinidad and Tobago	Government	27 Jul 90	01 Aug 90	6	100.0 %	Dem	30
Turkey	Government	13 Jul 91	31 Oct 92	477	100.0 %	Dem	50
Turkey	Terr: Kurdistan	15 Aug 84	31 Dec 00	5, 983	68.0 %	Semi-dem	33, 080
United Kingdom	Terr: Northern Ireland	01 Jan 71	15 Aug 98	7, 671	100.0 %	Dem	3, 149
Venezuela	Government	02 Jun 62	03 Jun 62	2	100.0 %	Dem	400
Venezuela	Government	04 Feb 92	29 Nov 92	300	100.0 %	Dem	183